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Abstract: An attempt to redefine science in the 21st century (BK Jennings, On the Nature of Science, Physics in 
Canada, 63(7) 2007) has abandoned traditional notions of natural law and objective reality, blurred the distinctions 
between natural science and natural history, elevated Occam’s razor from an epistemological preference to a scientific 
principle, and elevated peer-review and experimental care as equals with repeatable experiment as arbiters of 
scientific validity.  Our comments review the long-established axioms of the scientific method, remind readers of the 
distinctions between science and history, disprove the generality of Occam’s razor by counter example, and highlight 
the risks of accepting additional scientific arbiters as equal to repeatable experiment. 
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“On the Nature of Science”[1] presents many valid 
points regarding the epistemology and practice of 
science in the 21st century, but there are several 
important incongruities.
Three axioms presupposed by the scientific method 
are realism (the existence of objective reality), the 
existence of observable natural laws, and the 
constancy of observable natural law.[2] Rather than 
depend on provability of these axioms, science 
depends on the fact that they have not been 
objectively falsified.
Occam’s razor and related appeals to simplicity are 
epistemological preferences, not general principles 
of science.  The general principle of science is that 
theories (or models) of natural law must be 
consistent with repeatable experimental 
observations.  This principle rests upon the 
unproven axioms mentioned above.  Occam’s razor
supports, but does not prove, these axioms.  
There are many examples where Occam’s razor
would have picked the wrong theory given the 
available data.  Simplicity principles are useful 
philosophical preferences for choosing a more likely 
theory from among several possibilities that are 
each consistent with available data.  However, 
anyone invoking Occam’s razor to support a 
scientific preference should be aware that future 
experiments may well falsify the model currently 
favored by Occam’s razor.  One accurate 
observation of a white crow falsifies the theory that 
“all crows are black.”  Likewise, a single instance of 
Occam’s razor picking a wrong theory falsifies the 
razor as a general principle.
In addition, Occam’s razor fails to acknowledge that 
if multiple models of natural law make exactly the 
same testable predictions, they are equivalent and 
there is no need for parsimony to choose one that 
is preferred.  For example, Newtonian, Hamiltonian, 
and Lagrangian classical mechanics are equivalent.  
Which one of the three would be preferred by 
Occam’s razor?  Is this a justification for saying the 
other two are wrong?  Likewise, how would 
advocates of simplicity principles arbitrate between 
wave and matrix formulations of quantum 
mechanics?
Defining science broadly as internally consistent 
and logical models supported by observation 
removes the requirement of repeatable experiment 
and broadens the realm of applicability from 
questions of natural law to questions of history and 
nearly every other question the human mind can 
devise.  More importantly, it contains the implicit 
presupposition that observations that are limited in 
scope, audience, and duration are equally reliable 
as experimental observations that are repeatable a 
large number of times by any audience that bothers 
to exercise sufficient experimental care.  One also 
wonders to what degree documented observations 
of other parties are admissible.  Should less reliable 
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observations (not repeatable but documented by 
others) have the same epistemological status as 
repeatable experiments?
The author describes the three-legged stool of 
scientific error correction as experimental care, 
reproducible experiment, and peer review.  Like 
Occam’s razor, peer review is a temporal expedient 
for judging scientific work at a given time.  Peer
review serves the temporal interests of publishers, 
funding agencies, and employers.  The ultimate 
arbiter of scientific validity is repeatable experiment 
alone.
The three-legged stool of historical inquiry includes 
physical evidence (and scientific analysis thereof), 
documentary evidence, and eyewitness testimony.[3]  
When considering historical facts of legal 
significance, one is hard pressed to find many 
criminal convictions based only on scientific 
evidence without corroborating documentary or 
eyewitness testimony.  The legal system recognizes 
that the availability and quality of evidence degrades 
with time.  Increasing entropy guarantees that 
historical questions cannot be repeatedly tested as 
many times and by as many independent parties as 
questions of natural law.
Because models of natural law can be repeatedly 
tested by any audience that exercises sufficient 
experimental care, the reliability (or even the 
identity) of sources is less important in questions of 
natural law than in historical matters.  Few scientists 
would object to acceptance of a new theory or even 
an anonymous experimental result if it was 
repeatable by independent sources.  In contrast, the 
reliability of sources is critical in the believability of 
historical theories.  For example, if those collecting 
evidence at a crime scene are found to be careless 
or dishonest in their handling of evidence, the 
prosecution stands very little chance of gaining a 
conviction based on the evidence collected, and the 
procedure simply cannot be repeated in a manner 
that counteracts the unreliability of the original 
sources.
The author shifts from a relatively narrow definition 
of science as reproducible experiment to “anything 
that can be observed” in order to make the case that 
supernatural claims can be investigated 
scientifically.  However, this ignores the 
presupposition of constancy of natural law that 
underpins the demand of experimental repeatability 
as the ultimate arbiter in science.  Since science 
presupposes the constancy of natural law in the 
demand of experimental repeatability, supernatural 
claims cannot be falsified scientifically without 
creating a circular argument.  (In addition, most 
supernatural claims concern specific historical 
events rather than repeatable phenomena.)  The 
objectivity of science rests in experimental 
repeatability.
Defining science as “observationally constrained 
model building” is barely more specific than
defining science as “what scientists do.”  How far is 
this from defining sound science as “what scientists 
say” (with appropriate homage to peer review)?  At 
this point, is science really a powerful, objective 
epistemology for exploring natural law, or have we 
merely replaced one set of authorities (the Catholic 
Church of the Middle Ages) with another (the 
scientists of the 21st century)?  
We must not replace experimental repeatability with 
peer-reviewed observations as the ultimate arbiter 
of scientific validity.  Only repeatable experimental 
results qualify as scientific observations.  
Observations of physical and documentary 
evidence of historical events do not warrant equal 
status with repeatable experiments.
Evolution as a model of natural history is widely 
accepted because many expectations have been 
fulfilled by later discoveries of pre-existing 
evidence.  (Such later discoveries are better 
described as fulfilled expectations than specific 
predictions akin to Einstein’s prediction of the 
bending of light by gravitation.) As a scientific 
theory of ongoing biological processes, evolution 
would be strengthened by more direct future 
observations of speciation in higher organisms via 
the expected mechanisms of natural selection.  
“Predictive power” as an arbiter of science means 
the ability to predict the future course of systems 
under study, not merely the ability to predict future 
discoveries of pre-existing historical evidence.  
Valid models of natural law do not merely predict 
future discoveries of pre-existing evidence; they 
predict observations of future events.   
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Does failing to make an epistemological distinction 
between natural history and natural law really serve 
the interests of science?  Does replacing the 
demand for predicting results of repeatable 
experiment with the much broader “observable 
support” better prepare today’s student to become 
tomorrow’s scientist?
Science needs objective criteria to rank the value of 
predictions and observations without the appeals to 
authority inherent in peer review or “scientific 
consensus.”  Observations that are experimentally 
repeatable should rank higher than historical 
observations whose repeatability is limited by 
increasing entropy.  Specific predictions regarding 
future events should rank higher than expectations 
of future discoveries of pre-existing evidence.  Thus, 
the science of natural law is inherently more 
objective than scientific descriptions of natural 
history.
What is the benefit of pretending that science 
provides the same high levels of certainty in 
historical theories of origins (species, universe, solar 
system) as the more objectively and repeatably 
testable quantum electrodynamics and classical 
mechanics (within their well-established areas of 
applicability)?
In conclusion, parsimony and failure to distinguish 
history from science can conspire to produce 
unwarranted levels of certainty.  For example, 
consider an innocent man whose blood is found at a 
murder scene.  In the absence of observable 
exculpatory evidence, the Jennings definition of 
science would seem to demand his conviction, 
regardless of plausible alternate explanations that 
might be offered, since alternate explanations are 
likely more complex than the theory that the 
defendant is guilty.  
Afterword:
Jennings’ reply fails to acknowledge objective reality 
regarding the laws of nature, but his scientific 
method implicitly demands the existence of 
objective reality regarding what scientific authors 
knew and when they knew it in order to make valid 
distinctions between what he refers to as 
“predictions” and “post-dictions.”
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